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Assisting Developing Countries in Taxation after the OECD’s BEPS Reports: 
A Suggested Approach for the International Donor Community 
 
Michael C. Durst 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper explores how the international donor community might most productively offer 
technical assistance to developing countries in the area of taxation, in light of the OECD’s 
recently completed study of ‘base erosion and profit shifting’ (BEPS). The paper addresses both 
the political and the technical constraints facing developing country tax administrations. It 
recommends that donor agencies seek to build their technical assistance efforts through long-
term collaborations with developing country governments, and observes that the most productive 
technical assistance efforts might extend beyond the boundaries of the particular international 
tax issues that the BEPS studies address. The paper also explores two particular BEPS-related 
measures on which productive technical assistance may be especially feasible, namely the 
implementation of limitations on corporate interest deductions, and the construction of ‘transfer 
pricing safe harbours’. 
 
Keywords: developing country taxation; base erosion and profit shifting; corporate taxation.  
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Introduction and summary of conclusions 
 
This paper responds to the request of Agence Française de Développement (AFD) for advice 
concerning how the international donor community might most constructively assist developing 
country governments in improving the performance of their tax systems in light of the recent 
recommendations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
and other international organisations including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and the United Nations, relating to the problem of ‘base erosion and profit shifting’ 
(BEPS). BEPS refers to a very common form of tax planning by multinational business groups 
that depends upon corporate subsidiaries located in tax havens. 
 
Over recent decades, BEPS appears to have resulted in substantial avoidance of corporate 
income taxation in countries at all levels of economic development. As discussed below, 
however, revenue losses from BEPS can be seen as more damaging in developing than in 
wealthier countries, both because developing countries must as a practical matter depend 
relatively more heavily than wealthier countries on taxation from large businesses taxpayers, 
and because many developing countries face especially urgent needs for government revenues 
in order to invest in public infrastructure to alleviate persistent extreme poverty.  
 
In responding to AFD’s request, this paper first seeks to provide a political and economic 
understanding of the BEPS phenomenon, with particular emphasis on the pressures of ‘tax 
competition’ – that is, the dilemma faced by countries in attempting to collect tax revenues from 
multinational companies, while at the same time encouraging the companies to maintain and 
increase their local investments. Second, this paper describes two particular recommendations 
that the OECD and other organisations have made for reducing revenue losses from BEPS: 
namely, that countries consider adopting (i) stricter limitations on deductions of interest 
expenses by multinational companies, and (ii) ‘safe harbours’ for use in simplifying the 
administration of ‘transfer pricing’ rules, which are complex rules by which tax authorities can 
attempt to limit various deductions of local corporate subsidiaries that are engaged in BEPS 
transactions. Third, this paper suggests processes by which AFD and other donors might assess 
opportunities in the area of tax technical assistance and begin to develop productive 
relationships for this purpose with governments that desire assistance. Throughout, this paper 
maintains a focus on the practical challenges that tax competition raises for the design and 
implementation of technical assistance in the tax area.    
 
This paper concludes that promising opportunities exist for the donor community to contribute to 
the welfare of developing countries through technical assistance in taxation. However, the paper 
recommends that in beginning their engagement in technical assistance efforts, AFD and other 
donors should avoid prematurely advising countries to adopt particular anti-BEPS measures, as 
these measures might be unrealistic given the political and economic circumstances of the 
particular country. Instead, donors should seek to initiate long-term collaborations with selected 
countries that have indicated a strong interest in working with donors in the tax area, and, 
ideally, countries with which a particular donor already maintains close ties. Donors should, first, 
work closely with the tax and finance officials of those countries to identify forms of technical 
assistance that might be most suited to the countries’ political and economic circumstances. 
Depending on the outcome of this initial collaborative process, the technical assistance that is 
identified might relate to the kinds of international corporate tax issues raised by the BEPS 
phenomenon. Alternatively, the most promising technical assistance efforts might relate to 
problems in administering other types of taxes, like personal income and consumption taxes. 
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Many countries’ needs for improvement in the administration of these types of taxes are large 
and pressing, and these taxes generally do not raise concerns regarding tax competition as 
intensively as the corporate income tax, perhaps raising a greater likelihood of successful 
implementation. 
 
By engaging jointly with host country officials in identifying particular kinds of technical 
assistance to be provided, donors will maximise the likelihood of committed governmental 
support, which historically has been essential for any kind of tax technical assistance efforts to 
succeed. The final section of this paper will suggest procedural steps by which donors might 
initiate the envisioned long-term collaborative relationships with particular countries.  
 
 
1  Explanation of base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS) 
 
1.1 The fundamental dilemma of corporate taxation in developing countries 
 
A first step in understanding the problem of BEPS for developing countries is to understand the 
basic dilemma that these countries face in designing their tax systems. The world’s poorer 
developing countries require increased government revenues in order to build public 
infrastructure to address urgent requirements in health, education, and other basic human 
needs. Poorer countries, however, are more limited in their abilities to raise government 
revenues than the world’s wealthier countries. 
 
In wealthier countries, the bulk of government revenues come from broadly applied forms of 
personal taxation, including personal income tax, and consumption taxes like value-added tax 
(VAT). In poorer countries, however, low per capita earnings and levels of consumption in 
themselves limit the amount of revenue potentially available from personal income and 
consumption taxes. Moreover, in poorer countries, a large proportion of economic activity tends 
to be ‘informal’, in the sense that many business transactions are conducted in untraceable 
cash, and many employment arrangements are not formally documented. The combination of 
low per capita income and economic informality substantially limits the ability of many 
developing countries to raise revenue from ‘workhorse’ taxes like personal income tax and VAT; 
and as a result, total tax revenues, measured as a percentage of gross domestic product, tend 
to be much lower in the world’s poorer developing countries than in wealthier countries.1  
 
Another form of taxation, corporate income tax, exists in virtually every country in the world. 
Over time, corporate income tax has fallen into political disfavour in many of the world’s wealthy 
countries, largely based on a belief (which is common among economists but not universally 
shared) that taxes on corporate income unduly discourage business investment and therefore 
economic growth. Many countries have reduced the rates of their corporate income taxes 
substantially in recent decades,2 and have provided corporations with tax benefits of various 
kinds to encourage investment. In recent decades, in the world’s wealthier countries, the 
                                                 
1  The IMF, using a four-category classification of countries by income level (low, lower middle, upper and high), has estimated 
that as of 2013, the ratio of tax revenue to GDP in high-income countries was approximately 25 per cent, whereas in low-
income countries the ratio was less than 15 per cent.  IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank Group 2016: 7. 
2  IMF 2014: 22. 
  
8 
 
percentage of total government revenue attributable to corporate income tax has declined 
dramatically.3 
 
Because of the difficulties they face in raising revenue from personal income and consumption 
taxes, developing countries generally have not been able to reduce the relative importance of 
the corporate income tax in their fiscal systems. Income generated by corporations, particularly 
the local subsidiaries of foreign-owned multinational groups, tends to represent a large share of 
the total income generated each year in poorer countries, and corporate business tends to be 
documented by modern record-keeping systems. As a result, the relative share of total 
government revenues represented by corporate income tax has generally remained significantly 
higher in the poorer than in the wealthier countries.4 
 
Despite their relative dependence on corporate tax revenues, however, developing countries, 
like wealthier countries, perceive strong pressures to minimise the tax burden on corporations in 
order to avoid discouraging inbound investment. This competition is often said to create a ‘race 
to the bottom’, under which countries compete to find various ways to exempt companies from 
taxation on income from their local investments. There are indications, moreover, that the 
economic pressures of tax competition, and the resulting tendency to offer inbound investors 
exemption from taxation, are especially important for developing countries.5   
 
Many countries offer investing corporations explicit and formal exemptions from taxation. These 
take the forms of, for example, ‘tax holidays’ exempting companies from taxation for periods of, 
say, ten or fifteen years after commencing a new investment; and exemptions from taxation for 
companies willing to invest in designated ‘economic development zones’. The practice of 
countries offering corporate tax holidays, and tax exemptions based on special economic zones, 
has been common for well over 60 years,6 and the practice has expanded substantially over 
recent decades.7 
 
1.2 BEPS tax-avoidance structures 
 
Formal tax exemptions, however, have not been the only means by which governments have 
offered companies tax reductions in order to compete for investment. Approximately 70 years 
ago, international tax practitioners developed informal techniques of tax avoidance using 
corporations established in tax havens (what we now call ‘BEPS’ transaction structures), which 
over the years have resulted in the extension of significant de facto tax exemptions to 
multinational companies without the need for formal legislation. From the start, these 
arrangements tended to conform to four patterns, which today are familiar to all international tax 
practitioners.8 
 
1. Loan-based income-shifting transactions: A multinational group establishes a ‘finance 
company’ in, for example, the Cayman Islands, contributing a large amount of cash to 
this company. The finance company then extends a loan to a group member that 
                                                 
3  As of 2012, by IMF estimate, corporate income taxes accounted for less than 9 per cent of total government revenue in the 
world’s high-income countries. IMF 2014: 7. 
4  In 2012, by IMF estimate, low-income countries received about 16 per cent of their revenue from the corporate income tax. 
IMF 2014: 7. 
5  See Crivelli, De Mooij and Keen 2015; IMF 2015; Cobham and Jansky 2017. 
6  Lent 1967: 249 indicates that widespread use of tax incentives began shortly after the end of the Second World War.  
7  IMF 2015: 8. 
8  A useful summary of the various kinds of BEPS transactions can be found in OECD 2014a: 15-17. Extended descriptions 
can be found in Kleinbard 2011a and 2011b. A briefer treatment can be found in Durst 2012.   
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performs manufacturing operations in, for example, Kenya.9 The Kenyan operating 
company deducts interest paid on the loan, thereby reducing taxable income in Kenya, 
but no tax is imposed on receipt of the interest by the finance company in the Cayman 
Islands. 
 
2. Intangibles-based income-shifting transactions: A group contributes valuable intellectual 
property, like the trademark to a popular brand of beer, to an ‘intangibles holding 
company’ established in the Cayman Islands. A member of the group in, for example, 
Togo, which distributes the group’s beer in that country, pays royalties to the Cayman 
Islands company for the use of the trademark. The royalty payments are deductible in 
Togo, thereby reducing the distribution company’s tax liability in that country, but no tax 
is imposed when the royalties are received in the Cayman Islands. 
 
3. Income-shifting transactions involving related-party transactions in services and tangible 
property: Often, groups establish ‘hub’ or ‘principal’ companies in tax havens to engage 
in a variety of income-shifting transactions involving sales of services and of tangible 
property. For example, a multinational mining group with a parent company in Belgium 
might establish a ‘hub’ company in Bermuda. The Bermuda hub company might 
‘purchase’ valuable mining supplies and equipment from a group member based, for 
example, in Belgium, and ‘resell’ the supplies and equipment, with a profit mark-up, to a 
mining subsidiary based, for example, in Tanzania. Alternatively, the hub company might 
contract for the performance of technical services by employees of the Belgian parent 
company and ‘resell’ the services, at a profit, to the Tanzanian company. Under both 
scenarios, inflated payments from Tanzania contribute to tax-sheltered profits in the 
hands of the Bermuda company. 
 
4. Income-shifting transactions involving outbound sales of products: These kinds of 
income-shifting transactions are very common in the natural resources and agricultural 
sectors.10 As an example, a multinational group based in the Netherlands might be 
involved globally in the tyre business. The group might have a purchasing subsidiary in 
Laos, which buys raw rubber from farmers and ships it to the group’s tyre-making plants 
located around the world. Laos imposes corporate income tax at a 28 per cent rate. The 
group also might establish what it designates as a ‘marketing subsidiary’ in, say, 
Mauritius, which imposes a very low corporate income tax rate. The purchasing 
subsidiary might then enter into contracts to sell the rubber to the marketing company at 
10 per cent below the world market price; and the marketing company might then 
contract with the group’s tyre-making subsidiaries around the world, to resell the rubber 
to them at 5 per cent above the market price.11 In this manner, substantial profit can be 
shifted from the relatively high-tax Laotian subsidiary to very low-tax Mauritius. 
 
By means of these four basic techniques and variants of them, it became possible over the 
years for multinational companies to conduct business in countries around the world with little if 
                                                 
9  All of these examples are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to represent any particular transactions involving 
particular companies or countries.   
10  Problems in the taxation of natural resource producers are very important in resource-rich developing countries, and there is 
a substantial literature on income shifting in the natural resources sector. See generally Durst 2016b and sources cited 
therein.  Providing technical assistance in the area of natural resource taxation requires access to specialised industry 
expertise. 
11  Typically, under a purchase-and-resale arrangement of this kind, the product that is sold is never actually shipped to the 
haven marketing company. Instead, the product is shipped from the producing country directly to the places around the world 
where the product will be used. The purchase and resale essentially amount to a contractual fiction, occurring on paper but 
having no effect on the physical handling and shipment of the product concerned.   
  
10 
 
any corporate income tax liability, regardless of whether the countries offered formal tax 
exemptions through, for example, tax holidays or special economic zones. 
 
Occasionally over the decades, these tax avoidance structures have come under public scrutiny, 
with critics typically pointing to the artificiality of the tax haven companies that stand at the 
structures’ centres.12 In particular, from time to time, the home countries of multinational groups 
have enacted ‘controlled foreign corporation’ (CFC) rules that were designed to limit their 
multinationals from participating in the tax haven-based avoidance arrangements, but typically 
these proposals have been of limited coverage and relatively easily avoided.13 Overall, there has 
been little serious legislative effort in countries at all levels of economic development to interfere 
with the growth around the world of haven-based tax avoidance structures. 
 
Indeed, over the decades, countries around the world have adopted systems of international tax 
law that have had the effect of protecting haven-based tax planning structures from legal 
challenge. For example, although a great many haven-based tax avoidance plans involve loans 
made between members of the same multinational group, many countries around the world 
have refrained from adopting laws that would have prevented companies from deducting even 
very high levels of interest payments made to related companies in tax havens.14 In addition, in 
part through negotiations held under the auspices of the OECD, almost all the world’s countries 
have agreed to keep in effect difficult-to-administer arm’s-length transfer pricing rules. These 
place a heavy procedural burden on tax administrations that might seek to argue that a 
company’s royalties, management fees, or other payments to related parties were sufficiently 
excessive that deduction should be denied.15 In short, rather than seeking to eliminate haven-
based tax planning arrangements, governments around the world in effect have tended to 
protect them through the maintenance of what has come to be called an ‘international 
consensus’ of accommodating legal rules. 
 
1.3 Role of news media and civil society organisations after the 2007-8 financial 
crisis 
 
The global financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 directed a great deal of critical public attention to the 
business practices of the world’s multinational corporations, and also raised in many countries 
fears of serious reductions in public revenues. Investigative journalists around the world,16 as 
well as prominent civil society organisations (CSOs) that were concerned with problems of 
                                                 
12  An important example occurred in 1961, when U.S. President John F. Kennedy criticised tax-avoidance corporate structures 
used by U.S. multinationals, in language that would be equally up-to-date in 2017 (Kennedy 1961). 
 
Recently more and more enterprises organized abroad by American firms have arranged their corporate structures – 
aided by artificial arrangements between parent and subsidiary regarding intercompany pricing, the transfer of patent 
licensing rights, the shifting of management fees, and similar practices which maximize the accumulation of profits in a 
tax haven – so as to exploit the multiplicity of foreign tax systems and international agreements in order to reduce 
sharply or eliminate completely their tax liabilities both at home and abroad.  
 
CFC regimes, as they currently are in effect around the world, are discussed in OECD 2015a. 
13  The United States adopted the world’s first CFC rules, in Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code, in 1962. The rules were 
gradually weakened over time, however, and since the release of the IRS’s ‘Check the Box’ regulations in 1996, the rules of 
subpart F have been of little effect in constraining U.S. multinationals from engaging in haven-based tax avoidance. See 
generally Scott 2014. Many other countries maintain CFC rules in some form, although they have not been sufficiently strict 
to prevent haven-based tax avoidance from growing dramatically around the world. Apparently, governments around the 
world have been unable to maintain effective networks of CFC rules because of fear of reducing the competitiveness of their 
home-based multinationals. See generally Durst 2016a. In its BEPS report OECD 2015a, the OECD recommended that 
countries strengthen their CFC regimes, although politically there has been little if any movement among countries to do so. 
14  See the discussion of this topic at pages 12-14 of this report below. 
15  See the discussion of this topic at pages 14-18 of this report below. 
16  Representative news reports include Drucker 2011, Duhigg and Kocieniewski 2012, and Duncan and Cohen 2012. 
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global poverty,17 described the world’s global network of haven-based tax avoidance in terms 
understandable to the public. The media and CSO reports alleged that through these structures, 
the world’s multinationals were avoiding paying billions of dollars in taxes per year in the 
countries where these multinationals conduct business. 
 
Many news media reports focused on losses of tax revenues in some of the world’s wealthier 
countries. The reports by CSOs, however, tended to focus on apparent revenue losses in the 
world’s poorer developing countries. These reports pointed to the severe need in these countries 
for public infrastructure in the areas of health, education, and economic development, and 
alleged that revenue losses caused by haven-based tax avoidance structures were inflicting 
serious damage on vulnerable individuals. All of the reports, by media outlets and CSOs, 
generally acknowledged that the haven-based avoidance structures did not violate applicable 
legal rules, but many expressed the view that the widespread tax avoidance represented morally 
unacceptable behaviour on the part of the world’s multinational businesses. 
 
 
2  The OECD’s recently completed BEPS 
analysis 
 
2.1 In general 
 
The reports by media outlets and CSOs generated unprecedented public interest in haven-
based corporate tax avoidance in many countries in the world. In 2012, the G20 group of 
governments asked the OECD to commence an extensive study of the topic, which the OECD 
labelled ‘base erosion and profit shifting’, or BEPS.18 The OECD BEPS study was not directed 
primarily at problems faced by the poorer developing countries; indeed, much of the political 
protest that led to the BEPS study originated from apparent tax avoidance by multinationals 
operating in relatively wealthy countries, and the OECD itself is comprised of wealthy 
industrialised countries. The OECD nevertheless acknowledged the special vulnerability to 
BEPS of developing countries and consulted extensively during the BEPS study with 
representatives of developing as well as wealthy countries.19 
 
The completed OECD studies are voluminous and cover a number of technical topics in 
international corporate tax law.20 Some of the BEPS recommendations seek to remedy tax 
avoidance that occurs through highly complex kinds of financial transactions (including 
recommendations related to ‘hybrid financial instruments’). These recommendations are likely to 
be of interest primarily to policymakers in wealthier countries, and may be of relatively little 
practical significance to developing countries. Other recommendations involve the topic of 
                                                 
17  Widely noted reports by CSOs included Christian Aid 2009 and ActionAid 2010. 
18  The OECD formally initiated its BEPS study by publishing an Action Plan in 2013. OECD 2013. 
19  In the course of the BEPS study, several important reports were issued pointing to the special vulnerability of developing 
countries to revenue losses from BEPS. See International Monetary Fund 2014, and two reports by the OECD to the G20 
group of governments, OECD 2014a and 2014b.  
20  The OECD organised its BEPS study around 15 ‘actions’: Action 1: address the tax challenges of the digital economy; Action 
2: neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements; Action 3: strengthen CFC rules; Action 4: limit base erosion via 
interest deductions and other financial payments; Action 5: counter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into account 
transparency and substance; Action 6: prevent treaty abuse; Action 7: prevent the artificial avoidance of PE [permanent 
establishment] status; Actions 8, 9 and 10: assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation; Action 11: 
establish methodologies to collect and analyse data on BEPS and the actions to address it; Action 12: require taxpayers to 
disclose their aggressive tax planning arrangements; Action 13: re-examine transfer pricing documentation; Action 14: make 
dispute resolution mechanisms more effective; and Action 15: develop a multilateral instrument. 
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income tax treaties. These recommendations are of potential significance to developing 
countries but, because changes in countries’ tax treaty policies are likely to occur, if at all, only 
over extended periods of time, the BEPS recommendations related to income tax treaties offer 
relatively little potential for short-term revenue gains in developing countries. 
 
Two of the recommendations of the BEPS studies, however, might offer a realistic possibility of 
revenue benefits to developing countries, even in the short to medium term, through technical 
assistance efforts.21 These include (i) the recommendation of the BEPS Action 4 report (OECD 
2015b) that countries adopt more stringent limitations on interest deductions, and (ii) the 
OECD’s treatment of transfer pricing rules, which on one hand declines to recommend departure 
from the historical subjective and fact-intensive principle of ‘arm’s-length’ transfer pricing 
enforcement, but on the other hand appears to leave open the possibility that countries might 
adopt somewhat more simplified transfer pricing rules, perhaps incorporating some forms of safe 
harbours, which could result in more effective constraints on income shifting to related parties in 
tax havens.22 
 
2.2 Limitations on interest deductions 
 
The OECD concludes in its report on BEPS Action 423 that as a theoretical matter, each 
subsidiary within a multinational group should be permitted to deduct a reasonably determined, 
allocable share of the group’s total indebtedness to unrelated lenders. For example, if a 
multinational group as a whole holds indebtedness to unrelated lenders totalling €100,000,000, 
each member of the group should be entitled to deduct a portion of that amount, in proportion, 
for example, to the member’s share of the group’s net income before interest. Thus, as a 
theoretical ideal, the Action 4 report advocates what might reasonably be seen as a formulary 
approach to the apportionment of interest expense, which the OECD refers to as a ‘group ratio 
rule’. This approach would substantially curtail income shifting through the use of related-party 
loans, because group finance companies established in tax havens could not ‘manufacture’ debt 
to affiliates in excess of the group’s actual total indebtedness to outside parties. 
 
Despite the theoretical appeal of the group ratio approach, however, the Action 4 report 
acknowledges that the approach could pose administrative problems, and might be considered 
overly restrictive by some countries. As an alternative, the OECD has recommended that 
countries adopt ‘bright-line’ limitations on interest deductions, which generally would limit 
companies’ deductions to 30 per cent of their earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortisation (EBITDA).24 The OECD also recommends various exceptions and technical 
refinements to EBITDA-based rules, notably an exemption for financial businesses like banks 
                                                 
21  Participants in meetings organised by AFD in Paris in March 2017, involving personnel from the OECD and World Bank, 
generally expressed agreement that technical assistance in these areas has the potential for generating positive results. See 
also note 42 below. 
22  The OECD’s overall recommendations regarding transfer pricing are contained in its report on BEPS Actions 8-10, OECD 
2015c. Other suggestions for developing countries are contained in Platform for Collaboration on Tax 2017. 
23  In October 2015, the OECD released its final report on ‘Action 4: Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and 
Other Financial Payments (OECD 2015b), along with its final reports on other BEPS actions. Later, in July 2016, the OECD 
released two follow-up studies of technical issues related to limitations on taxpayers’ interest deductions: ‘Public Discussion 
Draft: BEPS Action 4 – Elements of the Design and Operation of the Group Ratio Rule’ (OECD 2016a) and ‘Public 
Discussion Draft: BEPS Action 4 – Approaches to Address BEPS Involving Interest in the Banking and Insurance Sectors’ 
(OECD 2016b). For an analysis of the policy issues that the OECD has addressed in connection with Action 4, see Durst 
2015.  
24  The OECD’s Action 4 report envisions that countries will use EBITDA-based limitations to replace or supplement existing 
‘thin-capitalisation’ rules which are common around the world. Thin capitalisation rules deny interest deductions if a 
taxpayer’s ratio of debt to equity exceeds a specified level (for example, 3 to 1). The OECD points out that multinationals can 
relatively easily avoid application of thin-capitalisation rules, in the context of BEPS, by injecting additional equity into their 
subsidiaries. 
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and insurance companies, which typically have very high interest expenses and for which an 
EBITDA limitation would not be suitable. 
 
The OECD has based its EBITDA recommendation on the actions of a number of countries 
around the world that already have adopted 30 per cent limitations, including Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Norway, Japan, Finland, and, as of April 1, 2017, the United Kingdom.25 It is notable as 
well that under France’s interest deduction limitations, which set forth several alternative 
limitations on deductions, interest deductions can in some circumstances be limited to 
approximately 25 per cent of a taxpayer’s EBITDA.26 In addition, in 2013, South Africa enacted 
limitations, which became effective in 2015, based generally on 40 per cent of EBITDA, although 
the limitation can vary based on market interest rates in the economy.27 In general, the rules that 
have been adopted around the world provide for special treatment of banking and other financial 
businesses, as recommended in the OECD Action 4 report. 
 
Politically, it is an open question in any particular instance whether a country will wish to adopt a 
30 per cent-of-EBITDA limitation, in light of continuing perceived pressures of tax competition. 
Indeed, Germany initiated the practice of EBITDA-based limitations on interest deductions 
almost ten years ago, well before the OECD’s BEPS analysis, and to date it appears that only 
one country in the developing world, South Africa, has adopted limitations based on the model. 
Nevertheless, the convergence around interest deduction limitations at or around 30 per cent of 
EBITDA suggests that an international consensus may be solidifying around that level. 
Accordingly, limitations of this kind might be a realistic means of reducing base erosion for 
developing countries with the appropriate political motivation. 
 
An important early step in evaluating possible limitations on interest deductions in a country 
should be a quantitative evaluation, based on information derived from previously filed tax 
returns, of the current ratios of interest deductions to EBITDA that local subsidiaries of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) are currently reporting. This process is necessary in order to 
be able to estimate the additional tax revenues that might be generated by EBITDA-based 
limitations on deductions. This process of revenue estimation may help the local tax 
administration identify areas in which its practices for extracting data from filed corporate income 
tax returns, and maintaining that data in useful form, might be improved. Also, government 
officials’ willingness to facilitate the revenue estimates may provide a good indication of whether 
political support exists for adoption of the deduction limitation.   
 
It is important that the drafting of an interest limitation statute be a collaborative process 
involving senior finance and revenue personnel from the host country. It will be necessary to 
conform the statute to the terminology and format, as well as the substantive provisions, of the 
country’s pre-existing revenue statutes.28 Also, under the leadership of appropriate government 
officials, consultations on the proposed statute should be conducted with potentially affected 
taxpayers (that is, with MNEs operating within the country). This process could be contentious, 
and may evoke claims by companies that the proposed legislation would discourage inbound 
                                                 
25  See generally Sheppard 2014 and PwC 2017. On July 12, 2016, the Council of the European Union issued a directive 
establishing the maintenance of limitations on interest deductions, generally conforming to the OECD BEPS 
recommendations, as standard practice for EU countries. European Union 2016, Article 4. 
26  See http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ID/France-Corporate-Group-taxation 
27  Republic of South Africa, Income Tax Act (revised), Section 23M. 
28   Although a statute limiting interest deductions is not unusually complicated according to the standards of tax legislation, 
drafting an interest limitation statute does pose technical challenges, especially with respect to coverage of special 
industries, like banks and insurance companies, for which the statute’s generally applicable EBITDA-based limitation will not 
be appropriate. Of course, there exists today a body of statutory language from those countries that have to date adopted 
EBITDA-based limitations. In addition, detailed technical discussion on the drafting of interest limitation statutes can be found 
in several sources, including the three OECD BEPS reports on the topic, (see note 23 above), and in United Nations 2017. 
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investment. Despite the possible controversy, however, consultation with potentially affected 
taxpayers is essential. It is necessary that taxpayers and the government maintain a reasonably 
cooperative relationship, and taxpayers should perceive that any limitations on interest 
deductions that are enacted resulted from a process of open and public negotiation, rather than 
being imposed entirely by governmental fiat. 
 
Following consultation, the next step, if feasible, would be enactment of the interest limitation 
statute according to the country’s regular legislative processes. Technical assistance might 
continue after enactment, and could include consultation with the tax administration in the 
examination of corporate returns for the first taxable years affected by the new statute. 
 
2.3 Transfer pricing safe harbours 
 
Under the classic BEPS tax avoidance structure, the multinational group typically tries to reduce 
its operating subsidiaries’ incomes to low levels. Under the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
the tax authorities of the country in which the operating subsidiary is located is generally entitled 
to test the adequacy of the income left in the subsidiary by applying one of five specified transfer 
pricing methods. The most frequently used is the ‘transactional net margin method’ (TNMM).29 
 
In theory, the TNMM is simple and straightforward. For example, in the case of an operating 
subsidiary of a multinational group engaged in the distribution of a high-margin, branded 
beverage, the tax authority is to locate data, from publicly available information, on the 
profitability of comparable distributors of high-margin beverages that are independent, in the 
sense that they are not owned within multinational groups. Based on this information, tax 
administrations are supposed to use statistical techniques to determine an ‘arm’s-length range’ 
of minimum operating income, which the subsidiary is supposed to maintain. If the subsidiary’s 
operating income falls below the bottom of the arm’s-length range, the tax authority is permitted 
to increase the taxpayer’s income by means of a transfer pricing adjustment.30 
 
In practice, however, TNMM has often proven ineffective in enforcing reasonable minimum 
levels of operating income in subsidiaries of multinational groups.31 The central problem is that in 
                                                 
29  Rules governing the TNMM are contained in Paragraphs 2.64 to 2.113 of the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. The OECD originally adopted the Guidelines in 1995, and has revised 
them on several occasions since. The OECD Guidelines offer taxpayers and tax administrations a variety of transfer pricing 
methods from which to choose, depending on the facts and circumstances. In practice, taxpayers and tax administrations 
typically use TNMM for the purposes of attempting to evaluate the profit levels of distribution, manufacturing and service-
provider subsidiaries. 
30  It is important to recognise that transfer pricing methods like TNMM generally are intended to require taxpayers to earn 
minimum levels of operating income within a particular country. Operating income is a measure of income before deduction 
of interest. Therefore, transfer pricing rules generally do not place restrictions on the levels of interest that taxpayers must 
deduct. This is why, in order to control base erosion, a country needs to adopt both effective transfer pricing methods, and 
separate rules for limiting interest deductions.   
31  The conceptual challenges facing successful implementation of TNMM (and its equivalent under the U.S. transfer pricing 
regulations, the comparable profits method (CPM)), are discussed in detail in Durst and Culbertson 2003: 105-114. In July 
2014, the OECD issued a report that describes the difficulties faced by developing countries in locating data for application of 
the TNMM, and suggests several possible approaches to improving operation of TNMM in developing countries, including 
development of transfer pricing safe harbours (OECD 2015c). The problems of applying TNMM in developing countries are 
also discussed in Platform for Collaboration in Tax 2017. 
Many have argued that the shortcomings of the OECD Guidelines extend well beyond TNMM, and derive instead from a 
general misunderstanding of the likelihood of finding ‘uncontrolled comparables’ for the activities that are engaged in among 
members of multinational groups. Some who point to this problem recommend that the OECD’s approach to transfer pricing, 
with its reliance on comparables, be replaced by a ‘formulary’ or ‘unitary’ system under which a group’s total, global income 
would be divided among group members based on their relative levels of actual business activity, like their sales to unrelated 
parties. For a recent collection of essays on this possibility, see Picciotto 2017. The OECD rejected a move toward global 
formulary apportionment in its BEPS recommendations; the IMF similarly advises against full adoption of formulary systems 
but notes that some elements of a unitary approach might be useful in transfer pricing rules for developing countries (IMF 
2014: 31-35). 
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practice, few if any independent companies can be found that are reasonably ‘comparable’ to 
the subsidiaries that are established by MNEs. For example, in many different industries, 
ranging from automobiles, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, to high-profit branded foods 
and beverages, all or almost all of the distributors in a country are likely to be members of 
multinational groups. In these industries, it is typically impossible to locate data on more than a 
few, if any, reasonably close comparables to use for the purposes of a TNMM analysis, and it is 
therefore impossible for tax authorities to use TNMM to compute a reliable arm’s-length range of 
results. The practical result is that taxpayers can make BEPS-style deductible payments to tax-
haven affiliates essentially without limitation. Indeed, it seems likely that in many cases, the 
amount of income that multinationals leave in their operating subsidiaries, after deduction of 
BEPS-style payments to tax havens, is limited more by a political desire of multinational 
companies to pay some level of tax in the countries where they operate, rather than by the 
compulsion of TNMM or another potentially applicable transfer pricing method. 
 
This situation might be remedied if tax administrations were not required to rely only on 
comparables data in seeking to establish arm’s-length ranges under TNMM, but instead were 
given authority to prescribe minimum operating income levels based on overall economic data in 
their countries. Indeed, one country, Brazil, has for a number of years taken this approach of 
prescribing required margins for local subsidiaries by administrative action, rather than 
attempting to analyse comparables on a case-by-case basis.32 The Brazilian approach, however, 
is inconsistent with the longstanding insistence of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines that tax  
authorities base their transfer pricing determinations only on detailed study of the unique facts of 
the company under examination, and that the determinations be based on reference to 
uncontrolled comparables. The OECD and its member countries remain insistent that the 
Brazilian fixed-margin approach violates the international consensus regarding permissible 
transfer pricing laws as set forth in the OECD Guidelines. 
 
An alternative approach, which is not as prescriptive as the Brazilian fixed-margin method, 
consists of the statement of ‘safe harbour’ operating margins for specified categories of limited-
risk subsidiaries engaged in distribution, manufacturing, and the provision of various kinds of 
services. Taxpayers would be assured that if their operating margins were at least as high as the 
safe-harbour levels, the tax authority would not subject them to transfer pricing examination. The 
safe-harbour margin levels would not be binding on taxpayers – that is, a taxpayer that believes 
the safe harbour margin level is too high would remain free to state a lower margin on its tax 
return – but at least in theory, taxpayers would face incentives to comply with the safe harbour in 
order to avoid the costs and uncertainties of undergoing transfer pricing examination. 
 
The 1995 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, reflecting their overall aversion to any departure 
from the use of comparables in transfer pricing enforcement, expressed disapproval of transfer 
pricing safe harbours.33 In 2013, however, the OECD revised the Guidelines and endorsed the 
use by countries of safe harbours as an aid to transfer pricing administration.34 The OECD’s 
acceptance of transfer pricing safe harbours chronologically preceded the release of the 
OECD’s BEPS reports and therefore, strictly speaking, is not a BEPS recommendation. The 
BEPS recommendations do not, however, conflict with the use of safe harbours, and it is clear 
that the OECD considers safe harbours to be within the range of measures that are permissible 
under OECD transfer pricing policies. The Platform for Collaboration on Tax, a consortium 
                                                 
32  The Brazilian transfer pricing system is described in United Nations 2013, chapter 10.2. 
33  See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (version as of 2010), chapter 
IV(E) (text subsequently replaced as described below). 
34  OECD, ‘Revised Section E on Safe Harbours in Chapter IV of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines’, May 2013, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/Revised-Section-E-Safe-Harbours-TP-Guidelines.pdf 
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including the OECD, United Nations, IMF and World Bank, has issued a toolkit on technical 
assistance in the area of transfer pricing, which prominently addresses the possibility of transfer 
pricing safe harbours.35 
 
India appears to be the only country to have attempted the use of safe harbours, on a large 
scale, for limited-risk subsidiaries operating in the country.36 The margins stated in the Indian 
safe harbour, however, appear to be perceived as unreasonably high, and reportedly few 
taxpayers have followed them.37  
 
Despite the limited experience with them around the world, safe harbours may be the only 
means realistically available to developing countries, under current political circumstances and in 
view of the tax laws already in force in developing countries, to enforce reasonable profit 
margins for risk-limited subsidiaries of MNEs. More prescriptive approaches like Brazilian-style 
fixed margins, or even safe harbour margins that are given the power of formal presumptions in 
tax examinations, are likely to receive intense criticism as violating the ‘international consensus’ 
in favour of case-by-case, comparables-based transfer pricing analysis that is still reflected in 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. In view of the continuing importance of risk-limited 
subsidiaries in BEPS tax-avoidance structures, it would seem desirable for developing countries 
to consider the extent to which, even within the inevitable constraints on their political feasibility, 
carefully-designed safe harbours might result in significantly higher reported operating margins. 
Currently, international organisations engaged in technical tax assistance in developing 
countries, including the Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT) comprising the OECD, World 
Bank, IMF and UN, are actively exploring whether it might be possible to assist in the 
development of transfer pricing safe harbour regimes.38 
 
Notwithstanding the potential promise of transfer pricing safe harbours in controlling BEPS in 
developing countries, however, they raise many as-yet unsolved technical and political 
problems. First, there is the question of how, in the absence of reliable data on comparables, tax 
administrations are to compute safe-harbour ranges of required income for subsidiaries 
operating in their countries. Attempts to rely on approximation, rather than on reference to 
comparables, are likely to raise objections that tax administrations are departing from the central 
principles of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. This basic dilemma in designing safe 
harbours has not yet been resolved in practice.   
 
Another unresolved question is how much presumptive weight safe harbours should have in tax 
examinations. One possibility is that safe harbour ranges of required income under TNMM 
should establish strong presumptions in favour of the tax administration, and that taxpayers 
seeking to support income levels below the safe harbour levels would need to make a strong 
factual showing that the lower income levels are justified. Some might argue, however, that 
giving this amount of presumptive force to safe harbours would tip the burden of proof in transfer 
pricing examinations excessively in favour of tax administrations, in contradiction to the general 
principle evident in the OECD Guidelines that the tax administration’s authority to adjust 
taxpayers’ income levels should be subject to substantial procedural limits. 
 
                                                 
35  Platform for Collaboration on Tax 2017. 
36  The United States and Mexico have, since the mid-1990s, provided taxpayers with a safe harbour with respect to the income 
of a confined class of manufacturing companies operating in Mexico, maquiladoras. See U.S. Internal Revenue Service, ‘IRS 
Announces Position on Unilateral APA Applications Involving Maquiladoras’, IR-2016-133, October 14, 2016, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-16-133.pdf?_ga=1.134315953.1959233956.1449872249   
37  See Lewis 2016. 
38  See Platform for Collaboration on Tax 2017: 69-77. 
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An alternative would be to give safe harbours only limited presumptive force, by providing that 
taxpayers reporting income levels within the safe harbour range would be immune from 
challenge by tax authorities, but that taxpayers could, if they desired, report lower income levels 
and remain subject to transfer pricing examination. Given the difficulties historically faced by tax 
administrations in conducting transfer pricing examinations under TNMM, however, this kind of 
limited-force safe harbour might not offer taxpayers sufficient incentive to report income levels 
within the safe harbour range. Overall, the question of how much prescriptive weight to assign 
safe harbour margins represents a central question in the design of transfer pricing safe 
harbours that has not yet been resolved. 
 
As in the design of interest deduction limitations as discussed above, an early step in evaluating 
the potential benefit of safe harbours in a country should be to analyse existing corporate tax 
return information in cooperation with host country officials. The analysis would seek to 
determine the operating margins that risk-limited subsidiaries are currently reporting in the 
country, and therefore the scope for increased revenues from safe harbours.39 
 
If the analysis of data collected from tax returns proves promising, work might begin on 
designing safe harbours for the three categories of subsidiaries to which TNMM analysis is most 
commonly applied: distribution, manufacturing, and service-provider subsidiaries. It is very 
important that safe harbour margins do not exceed levels that are consistent with taxpayer 
expectations under the arm’s-length standard; otherwise, taxpayers will likely decline to apply 
the margins, preferring to risk examination by and controversy with the tax authorities. As a 
practical matter, tax administrations might want to establish safe harbour margins at levels 
slightly lower than perceived ‘arm’s-length’ levels, in order to encourage taxpayers to use the 
safe harbours. Given the great difficulties faced by tax authorities in enforcing the TNMM method 
through examinations, safe harbours even at relatively low levels may generate more revenue 
than could be raised in their absence. 
 
Overall, the prospects for successful application of transfer pricing safe harbours in developing 
countries are sufficiently encouraging to justify efforts to assist countries in considering them. 
However, the design of safe harbours will require resolution of questions that are as political in 
nature as they are technical. Especially given the limited experience with safe harbours around 
the world to date, donors should recognise the difficulty and uncertainty involved in efforts to 
design and implement successful safe harbours. Efforts to develop and implement safe 
harbours, while offering realistic prospects for benefit to developing countries, should, as 
discussed further immediately below, constitute only a portion of technical assistance efforts. 
 
 
3  Further observations on potential work 
  
3.1 The need for long-term, collaborative relationships with host countries 
 
A recent report on technical assistance to developing countries authored by the PCT40 confirms 
that technical assistance involves not only technical challenges of tax design and administration, 
                                                 
39  See in this connection note 46 below, relating to one significant aspect of the revenue estimation process in developing 
countries.  
40  Platform for Collaboration on Tax 2016. The PCT’s report contains substantial information about the history of technical 
assistance efforts by international organisations, as well as possible avenues of future work, and should serve as a useful 
point of reference for AFD. In addition, of course, as evidenced by AFD’s March 2017 meetings in Paris on technical 
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but also, typically, difficult political challenges. Pressures of tax competition, of the kind 
described earlier in this report, are likely to cause political ambivalence in many countries 
concerning the desirability of tax measures that would reduce revenue losses to BEPS, and 
thereby result in effective tax increases on corporations with investments in the country. 
Sometimes, this ambivalence can involve active disagreement between officials in different 
governmental departments with, for example, finance and tax officials favouring measures to 
increase tax collection from multinationals, whereas officials charged with encouraging 
investment in the same country might strongly oppose these measures. In light of this kind of 
political ambivalence, which probably is present to at least some extent in every country of the 
world, it is not surprising that the recent PCT report warns, as part of its main findings: ‘An 
indispensable prerequisite to improving tax capacity is enthusiastic country commitment.’41 
 
An essential part of successful technical assistance, therefore, consists of obtaining sincere 
support for the assistance efforts from both senior levels of government, as well as the 
personnel within the tax administration who will need to implement any measures that might 
arise from the assistance.42 The situation of each country, moreover, is likely to be unique, with 
countries varying significantly in the extent of their perceptions of being exposed to tax 
competition, and also in the current level of training and technological capacity of their tax 
administrations. There is always a danger that those beginning efforts to provide technical 
assistance to a country will approach their tasks excessively influenced by preconceptions 
concerning the particular kind of assistance that might be most useful. Host country personnel 
might easily perceive the suggested approach to assistance as being unrealistically naive, in 
view of local political or other realities. This kind of situation can easily lead to the failure of a 
technical assistance mission – and indeed, to the mission never really getting started.   
 
In entering into engagements to provide tax technical assistance, donors should avoid 
prematurely formulating specific proposals for legal changes or other reforms in the host 
countries in which it will be working. Instead, a donor should be careful to initiate a process in 
which host government and donor personnel, jointly, first conduct research on the various 
elements of the country’s revenue and tax administration system and then, together, identify 
particular projects that appear to offer the best prospect of being productive. 
 
Therefore, a donor’s first task should be to establish ongoing consulting relationships with the 
tax administrations and finance ministries of several (perhaps, initially, two or three) different 
developing countries, and to establish ongoing dialogues with officials concerning the kinds of 
technical assistance that are likely to be most beneficial to the particular country. A donor like 
AFD, for example, might identify the countries from among those with which the agency has 
maintained close relationships outside the tax field. In addition, international organisations like 
the OECD, World Bank or IMF might serve as intermediaries in placing AFD and other donors in 
contact with countries that might be interested in collaboration in the tax area. 
 
In short, the most promising way to approach technical assistance is to treat it as an ongoing 
process involving continuing, joint research and learning with host country personnel. 
                                                                                                                                                  
assistance, members of the organisations that comprise the PCT appear willing to collaborate with AFD in planning and 
conducting technical assistance efforts, and AFD should maintain close contact with these organisations. 
41  Platform for Collaboration on Tax 2016: 3.  
42  The recent PCT report on technical assistance observes in this connection: 
 
Successful strengthening of tax capacity can only be country-driven, requiring continued energy, enthusiasm and 
commitment from the highest levels. External support can provide critical help. ... But ultimately it is the country itself that 
will determine success or failure. 
   
Platform for Collaboration on Tax 2016: 17-18. 
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Recommendations for particular assistance efforts should be made only after an appropriate 
process of joint consideration. It is only in this way that the appropriate support can be built for 
those initiatives that appear to offer the most promise for successful implementation. 
  
3.2 The need to consider opportunities for domestic as well as international 
technical assistance projects 
 
Donors should remain open, depending on how their collaborations with host countries proceed, 
to offering assistance in the areas of domestic as well as international taxation. There may well 
be opportunities to engage productively in technical assistance relating to international taxation, 
particularly with respect to interest limitations and transfer pricing safe harbours. As discussed 
above, however, both of those suggested initiatives are likely to face political opposition as well 
as technical challenges. Given the political and economic pressures of corporate tax 
competition, it may be more realistic to envision developing countries improving their fiscal 
positions by improving domestic tax administration than by the taxation of cross-border 
investors. 
 
Thus, dialogue with host country personnel might identify as promising subjects for technical 
assistance domestic measures like improving tax examinations of high-net-worth individuals,43 or 
improving compliance in the ‘informal’ economy (which includes high-income taxpayers 
operating cash-based businesses, as well as low-income taxpayers).44 The ultimate outcome of 
consultation with host country personnel might end up consisting of a programme of assistance 
that includes both domestic and international tax initiatives. 
 
3.3 The importance of generating necessary data on the local tax system 
 
An important aspect of the initial phase of long-term collaboration with a host country should be 
the assembly of revenue data needed to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
different components of the tax rules within a country, as well as the particular needs of the 
country in different areas of tax administration. High-quality tax information is also necessary to 
develop revenue estimates for particular proposals.45 Countries vary markedly in the extent to 
which they maintain revenue data, and data on tax administration, and in many instances lack of 
available data will pose a significant challenge in determining the highest priorities for technical 
assistance.46 The earliest phases of a long-term technical assistance relationship might include 
concentrated work on data collection and maintenance processes within a country.   
 
3.4 Capacity-building aspects of technical assistance 
 
It also should be borne in mind that technical assistance in taxation can take two basic forms. 
First, some technical assistance is directed toward the enactment of particular legal and 
regulatory initiatives, like limitations on interest deductions and transfer pricing safe harbours. 
                                                 
43  See Kangave, Nakato, Waisla and Lumal Zzimbe 2016. 
44  See generally Joshi, Prichard and Heady 2015. 
45  In evaluating potential revenue gains from safe harbours, interest deductions and other proposals in the corporate tax area, it 
is important to note that many developing countries have adopted ‘alternative minimum taxes’ for corporations, which 
typically are designed to prevent taxable incomes from falling below a specified percentage (say, 0.5 per cent) of the 
corporation’s gross receipts. See Best, Brockmeyer, Jacobsen Kleven, Spinnewijn and Waseem 2015. In providing technical 
assistance to a country in the area of corporate taxation, it is important to determine whether the country has adopted an 
alternative minimum tax and, if so, to understand the effects of the minimum tax on corporate tax revenues. 
46  See African Tax Administration Forum 2016. The maintenance of high-quality revenue and tax administration data within a 
country is crucial to the maintenance of transparency in tax policy and tax administration. It is likely that work to improve data 
collection and maintenance within a particular country will raise political considerations of various kinds, which can pose 
substantial challenges in determining the highest priorities for technical assistance. 
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Second, a large number of technical assistance projects historically have focused on building 
administrative capacity in developing countries. These include such diverse initiatives as (i) 
establishing mentoring and ‘job shadowing’ programmes for tax inspectors and other tax and 
finance officials, through which experienced personnel can share skills and techniques; (ii) 
developing better information technology systems for use both in direct tax administration and in 
maintaining accurate governmental financial and tax statistics to promote transparency; and (iii) 
assistance in the organisation of revenue and finance departments, including the design of 
employee retention programmes and internal audit capacities.47 
 
4  Possible sequence of steps for a donor 
 
Based on the analysis above, a donor might approach its decision making and planning with 
respect to tax technical assistance efforts according to the following sequence. 
 
1. Determine whether the donor agency has access to personnel resources needed for 
long-term technical assistance collaborations: The necessary resources need not, of 
course, come only from within the particular agency, but also could come from other 
government agencies, as well as from non-governmental sources. It needs to be 
recognised, though, that a successful technical assistance programme will require a 
long-term commitment from the personnel involved. In order to maintain an ongoing 
relationship with a particular host country, a core team of at least two or three experts will 
need to devote substantial portions of their professional time to the technical assistance 
effort over an extended time period. 
2. Identify particular countries with which to initiate technical assistance efforts: This 
process might begin through conversations with tax and finance officials in countries with 
which the donor already has ongoing relationships outside the area of taxation. In 
addition, contacts at the World Bank, OECD and other international organisations can 
provide referrals to countries that might benefit from a technical assistance relationship. 
A particular donor might wish to begin its technical assistance efforts by establishing 
ongoing relationships with, perhaps, two countries. Working with two countries 
simultaneously should accelerate the donor’s progress along its learning curve in the tax 
area, especially by providing indications of how different countries’ political and economic 
circumstances might affect the choice of highest-priority areas for technical assistance. 
3. Begin relationships with a substantial period of data gathering and joint learning: In order 
to identify the highest priority areas for technical assistance, donor and host country 
personnel will need to develop a comprehensive understanding of the country’s various 
revenue sources, and of the relative strengths and weaknesses of its tax administration. 
As mentioned above, countries vary widely in their practices of data gathering and 
maintenance, and the gathering of necessary data may pose an early challenge in 
beginning technical assistance efforts. In general, a donor and the governments with 
which it is working should, over the course of a series of intensive on-site meetings, 
perhaps over a period of a year, jointly develop as full an understanding as possible of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the local tax system and tax administration, as well as 
local political and economic conditions, in order to identify the most promising areas for 
assistance efforts.48 
                                                 
47  Platform for Collaboration on Tax 2016 describes various technical assistance initiatives that have addressed administrative 
needs. 
48  In gaining an understanding of a particular country’s tax administration, it would be useful to seek advice from officials 
involved in the Tax Administration Data Assessment Tool (TADAT) project, which is administered by a consortium that 
includes the IMF, the World Bank, and a number of other donor agencies. See www.tadat.org. TADAT has, in recent years, 
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4. Initiate particular technical assistance projects: The identification of particular technical 
assistance projects should follow naturally from the initial joint consultations with host 
country personnel. It may be the case that some projects are of sufficiently obvious value 
that they could commence even before the end of the initial consultation period. For 
example, if a country already has a strong political commitment to limiting companies’ 
interest deductions, work might begin relatively early on a project of legislative drafting of 
an EBITDA-based statute that would be appropriate for that country’s situation. In 
addition, if capacity building in the form of mentoring seems promising, those efforts 
could begin relatively early in the consultation period, and could provide valuable insights 
for use in identifying additional technical assistance projects through the collaborative 
learning process.  
                                                                                                                                                  
accumulated significant experience in attempts to systematically analyse different national tax administrations in a technical 
assistance setting. Nevertheless, even if TADAT has already accumulated substantial useful information concerning a 
particular country’s tax administration, it very likely will be necessary to generate additional information, at a high level of 
detail, in order to be able to conduct a technical assistance project effectively. 
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